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A B S T R A C T
The positive role that an active civil society plays in processes of democratisation
is often highlighted in the literature. However, when it comes to the Middle
East and North Africa, such activism is considered to be detrimental to demo-
cratisation because the predominant role is played by Islamist groups. The
explanation for this rests with the perceived ‘uncivil ’ and undemocratic Islamist
ethos of such groups. This paper challenges this assumption and argues that
Islamist associations can be a potential force for democratisation for three
reasons. First, they are capable of political learning; secondly, they generate
secular civil society activism as a response to their activities, increasing the
number of actors in the political and social system; and ﬁnally, they can
cooperate with other civil society groups on a number of issues, given that they
are all subject to the same authoritarian constraints. The paper focuses in
particular on the case of Morocco and the Islamist group Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The literature on democratisation pays much attention to the concept of
civil society and its presumed ability to foster and sustain the democratic
process. In fact, studies on processes of democratisation often highlight the
positive role that an active civil society plays in transitions from author-
itarianism. Thus, ‘building a robust civil society is … postulated as a pre-
condition for democratisation and democratic consolidation’ (Sardamov
2005: 380). This has important repercussions at both scholarly and policy-
making levels. Academically, the focus is on ‘ the zone of voluntary
associative life beyond family and clan aﬃliations but separate from the
state and the market ’ (Hawthorne 2004: 5), in order to understand the
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positive impact on political change, particularly in terms of democracy
training, that civil activism entails. From a policy-making point of view,
the expansion of civil society has become the preferred tool to generate
political change for both external donors and domestic opposition (see
Carothers 1999). This has profound consequences in terms of how the
domestic opposition is structured, and how external donors provide
programmes aimed at promoting and sustaining non-governmental
organisations in target countries to achieve democratic reforms at the
macro level.
There is no doubt that the usefulness of civil society to generate political
change may be overemphasised (see Tempest 1997), but it still occupies a
prominent position in the literature, and its protagonists are convinced of
the validity of the causal mechanism between expanding civil society and
democratisation. The Middle East and North Africa has not escaped
examination regarding the relationship between the state’s authoritarian
nature and the strength or weakness of civil society. Indeed, one of the
strongest conclusions emerging from such studies has been that civil
society in the region was too weak to have a positive impact on democratic
reforms, and that ‘ the state ﬁnancial and coercive power remains strong
and far superior to resources available to its social, economic, and political
opposition’ (Abootalebi 1998: 46) within society. While this analysis (see
Filaly-Ansary 2002) may contain some truth for certain countries, it should
also be underlined that it has been contradicted by other scholars who
convincingly argue that civil society activism is quite strong in large parts
of the region. In particular, Norton (1995–96) demonstrated that Middle
Eastern civil societies, far from being ‘quiet ’ and passive, were indeed
surprisingly active. In an interesting academic U-turn, it was then argued
that democracy was not occurring in the region precisely because civil
society was too vibrant and had an authoritarian nature, due in large part
to the fact that much of the activism seemed to originate from Islamist
movements (see Volpi 2004).
This study challenges the conventional wisdom that Middle Eastern
and North African civil societies are inherently authoritarian because of
the role that Islamist movements and associations play. It argues instead
that some of these movements can be a potential force for democratic
change, in the light of four variables. First, their political discourse is often
couched in the language of democratic procedures, and emphasises the
need to structure society on accountable political institutions in opposition
to the incumbents’ authoritarianism. Secondly, the internal structure of
most of these movements is surprisingly reliant on democratic procedures,
with a considerable role played by ordinary members (see Mishal & Sela
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2000), although leadership charisma is also a relevant component.
Thirdly, these movements have an indirect beneﬁcial eﬀect on general-
ising activism in society, because they have a polarising ideology which
generates opposition from social groups that feel threatened by it. Finally,
such associations have a rather precise understanding of social pluralism,
and are increasingly tolerant of groups and associations that do not
necessarily share their societal outlook.
All this does not mean embracing the view that civil society per se is, and
should always be, positively associated with democracy. It simply means
that the context within which the concept of civil society operates is
extremely important for its analytical application. A ‘deﬁnitional ’ positive
perception of the pro-democracy role that civil society plays is misplaced,
because both as a theoretical concept and as a concrete entity it should be
construed as a neutral analytical category. However, we should not go to
the opposite extreme, and accept that the ideological nature of Islamist
actors negatively biases civil society. This view should be dismissed be-
cause it does not take into account the social structure and the political
system of the societies within which Islamists operate. Civil society acti-
vism is context-dependent, and movements operating in diﬀerent political
settings may be confronted by radically diﬀerent instrumental calculations,
despite their ideological similarities. In the case of Morocco, civil society
has for instance ‘a connotation that is related to political contestation and
to the legitimate expression of the Moroccan people in the absence of real
democratic representation’ (Sater 2002: 103). Following from this, this
paper concentrates on Moroccan civil society and the role that Islamism
plays within it. Attention is given primarily to the Moroccan Jamiat al-Adl
wal-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality Group, hereafter Jamiat), and its inter-
actions with other non-governmental groups.
C I V I L O R U N C I V I L S O C I E T Y?
The concept of civil society has for some time been at the centre of the
attention of both academics and policy-makers, in the light of its very close
association with liberal-democracy, and is a highly controversial analytical
tool and political concept. Civil society, understood as ‘a cluster of
institutions and associations strong enough to prevent tyranny, but which
are, nevertheless, entered freely rather than imposed either by birth or
by awesome ritual ’ (Gellner 1994), has always had positive normative
connotations. In democratic societies, the existence of an autonomous
space between the state, the market and the family is believed to sustain
the democratic political system, due to its ability to bring citizens together
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without coercion. The voluntary nature of movements which mobilise
around very diﬀerent and, at times, conﬂicting issues and interests allows
society to develop ties that transcend kinship, and that do not see the state
as the ultimate provider of material goods and services. The existence of
such an active civil society is interpreted as a positive development for
democracy, because it promotes the interaction of people in a voluntary
setting, where diﬀerences of opinion have to be taken into account because
such groups have diverse interests. The state does not interfere with this
autonomous space where demands can develop, issues can be discussed
and activities organised. It follows that the withdrawal of individuals from
such activities is perceived as a problem for democratic societies, as high-
lighted by Puttnam (2000). The positive connotations that an active civil
society has in democratic countries have been transferred to authoritarian
states or democratising countries. In these diﬀerent contexts, the ability of
independent social actors to prise away an autonomous sphere of action
from the state is perceived to be vital in undermining the authoritarianism
that characterises political and social relationships. This is because a
sphere with no oﬃcial state intervention develops, and becomes an em-
bryonic space within which to make political demands on an authoritarian
political system. In addition, the ‘participants ’ learn skills that can
eventually be utilised in a democratising or democratised polity (see
McLaverty 2002).
Following from this, the literature on transitions to democracy in-
vestigates the role of civil society as an explanatory variable for the demise
of authoritarianism. A number of studies conducted on Eastern Europe
seemed to conﬁrm its explanatory power (see Rau 1991). As mentioned
earlier, such enthusiasm for civil society has recently diminished, but has
by no means disappeared. The literature points out that countries with a
growing civil society were either democratic or getting there, while
countries with a weak and passive civil society were deeply authoritarian
and likely to remain so. Early studies on the Middle East and North Africa
conformed to these assumptions, and the absence of democracy in the
region was partly explained through the absence of truly active and
independent civil societies ; this absence was blamed on Islam, which was
believed to require passive citizens. Mardin (1995) argues, for instance,
that in the Muslim world society waits for the ‘ just prince’ to initiate
reforms and take control of societal development, rather than mobilising
itself independently. Superﬁcially, the signiﬁcant and intertwined roles
played by both state authoritarianism and ties of tribal kinship in Middle
East and North African politics seemed to testify to the validity of such an
analysis. However, Norton’s (1995–96) extensive study on civil society in
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the region contradicted much of this previous scholarship. His study dem-
onstrated that civil society activism had been largely ignored in the
academic world, but was an important political reality. According to
Nonneman (2001: 143), ‘Norton’s study demolished the myth that the
region was uniquely lacking in such a category, while examining the
varieties and variations with it. ’ Norton’s study quickly became the con-
ventional wisdom, but it left open the problem of Middle Eastern and
North African authoritarianism. If one wanted to explain the absence of
democracy in the region through the category ‘civil society ’, it could no
longer be argued that these societies were passive, because there was now
evidence to the contrary.
Thus, some were led to explain the absence of democracy in the region
by emphasising that the few associations and movements that were truly
autonomous from the regime were far too vibrant and too politicised to
sustain democratic institutions. The popularity of this explanation is due
largely to the fact that over the last three decades the most active and
popular civil society actors have been Islamists. Their activism is perceived
to be uncivil rather than civil, and therefore more conducive to authori-
tarian political and social relationships than to democratic ones. Sami
Zubaida (2001: 239) gives a convincing account of this : ‘many secularist
writers have tried to exclude Islam and Islamism from deﬁnitions of civil
society. This is partly on the grounds that Islam and Islamism are part of
traditional and primordial formations, and partly on the perceived
incompatibility of a religious-based society, sought by Islamism, with
pluralist democracy. ’ Examples of movements such as the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood have therefore been used to undermine the previous
positive connotations that civil society enjoyed, and to argue that such a
concept should not be treated normatively (see Berman 2003). At policy-
making level, Amy Hawthorne (2004: 12) also warns the US government
not to be so enthusiastic about civil society in the Arab world, precisely
because the most active actors are Islamists and the ‘Islamist sector does
not constitute a pro-democracy force’.
From a theoretical point of view, both Berman and Hawthorne make a
very important contribution because they advance the notion that civil
society should be treated as a neutral category and not as a normative one.
Thus, while there may have been a high correlation between an active
civil society and democracy in Eastern Europe or Latin America, this
should not lead one to assume that a vibrant civil society automatically
sustains democracy and liberalism. As Najem (2003: 186) also correctly
points out, ‘ it is important to note that civil society closely reﬂects class and
social divisions in society, and that substantial groups within society in a
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state can be anti-democratic ’. Civil society is per se neither good nor
bad, but it is as good or bad as its actors make it. This study shares this
theoretical perspective, but contests the way in which Islamist movements
have been studied in the Arab world in order to make this theoretical
point. There is an underlying assumption that all the movements which
subscribe to Islamism are inimical to democracy, that they condone
political violence, and that they have a totalitarian ideology, whose essence
and objective are the desire to transform human nature and society once
they manage to acquire power. To quote Berman (2003: 266) : ‘a ﬁnal
important lesson that the Egyptian case teaches is that at least in certain
contexts, the civil society sceptics may have a clearer vision than
the boosters. The growth of civil society should not be considered an
undisputed good, but a politically neutral multiplier. ’
This debate on civil society in the Arab world is particularly welcome,
in the light of the prominent role that it plays in the region. Contrary to
other parts of the world where opposition political parties take the lead in
attempting to extract democratic reforms from the authoritarian regime,
political parties in the MENA region are both discredited and weak (see
Willis 2002). For this reason civil society has taken on the role of the main
opposition, as scores of political opponents have for instance abandoned
the political struggle to focus on making changes in society that would
have a knock-on eﬀect on the political system. Parties are increasingly
perceived, at least in the Moroccan context, as self-serving ‘mediators
between the political elite and the real wielder of power’ (Le Journal
Hebdomadaire 18.9.2004). Thus, far from being extremely weak and passive,
civil society organisations have become the primary instigators of change,
marginalising oﬃcial political parties. Some authors argue this is not
necessarily a positive omen for democratisation. A strong civil society
coupled with weak parties allows incumbents to divide the opposition by
selecting the issues that make it to the top of the political agenda, by
rewarding some NGOs over others, and by remaining the ultimate
decision-maker (see Langohr 2004). However, the rapid expansion of civil
society cannot be underestimated in terms of the impact it has on the
political system, and in the light of the demands it makes and the issues it is
concerned with (see Chomiak 2002). Thus, it is theoretically possible to
conceive it as being central to the processes of liberalisation in the region.
In addition, Islamist associations that now operate within the sphere of
civil society do so as NGOs, because they cannot become political parties
and are therefore unable to articulate their demands in an institutional
setting. If they were allowed to fully participate in a democratising process
as legal political formations, political parties would assume much more
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relevance, as other groups would be encouraged to organise in the
same way.
The explanation that authoritarianism in the region remains robust
because civil society is too active and Islamicised to trigger a real process of
democratic political change therefore faces a number of shortcomings.
First of all, the labelling of all Islamist associations as being un-democratic
by virtue of their Islamic ethos may not reﬂect the reality, and is often
derived more from prejudice than focused analysis. While Islamist move-
ments have peculiar views about democracy, they strongly oppose
incumbent regimes precisely because they do not rule consensually, and it
could be argued that if they were to espouse the same logic of authori-
tarian rule they would be delegitimised. There are certain Islamists who
indeed make a point of strongly emphasising their democratic beliefs and
political behaviour, such as the Tunisian Ennahda Party or the moderate
Algerian Movement for Society and Peace. Islamist groups also vary both
in ideology and methods from one another, due to confessional diﬀer-
ences, leadership style and external constraints. To assume that they are
all the same because of a shared Islamic ethos is misleading in two ways.
One, it presupposes that Islam is incompatible with democracy a priori,
which may not be the case, while very often the demands put forth by
Islamists are couched in the language of democracy; and secondly, it
assumes that all Islamist associations share the same outlook on how
society should be organised, which again may not be the case, given the
enormous diﬀerences that exist between countries in the Middle East and
North Africa.
The second shortcoming of the approach outlined above is the
empirical focus on extreme groups and on their most illiberal demands.
This leads to an oversimpliﬁcation of the issues that such movements are
primarily concerned with, and legitimises their label as ‘uncivil ’ actors,
even though they represent large sectors of society that would otherwise
lack any representation, such as the marginalised youth of the shanty-
towns, women from poor backgrounds and sectors of the disaﬀected
middle classes. Their welfare work and their constant criticism of the
incumbents are the pillars of their strategy.
Thirdly, to argue that democracy is absent in the region because of the
existence of an illiberal and undemocratic civil society underestimates the
nature of the states under examination, which are highly repressive and
rely heavily on the ‘coercive apparatus ’ (see Posusney 2004).
Students of the region are very much preoccupied with the ‘nature of
the Islamist opposition’, and tend to neglect the role authoritarian leaders
and elites play. At times there seems to be a benign view of these regimes,
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on the basis that if they were to fall, a much more confrontational and
illiberal set of elites would come to power. Zakaria (2004: 2) is therefore
able to argue that : ‘ the Arab rulers of the Middle East are autocratic,
corrupt, and heavy-handed. But they are still more liberal, tolerant, and
pluralistic than those who would likely replace them.’ The problem is that
we do not actually know whether this will be the case or not. Moreover,
in the past such regimes were just as reluctant to liberalise even in the
absence of an Islamist opposition.
It then becomes imperative to better examine both the nature of the
state and the nature of the opposition, without utilising sweeping state-
ments about the intrinsic illiberal nature of Islamist movements and their
presumed ‘totalitarian’ social activism. The existence of a particular ‘sub-
culture ’ inspired by an authoritarian ideology should be not seen in
isolation, but in the context of the wider society where competing ideas are
exchanged (see Brumberg 2002a).
There are some starting points that need to be highlighted when dis-
cussing the phenomenon of Islamism. First of all, Islamist associations are
not the only autonomous entities that characterise civil society in the
Middle East, although they are the most popular. There are many other
movements that, while possibly minoritarian, articulate alternative
demands to the ones that the Islamist movement is concerned with, and
operate in all sorts of sectors of civil activism from pro-democracy work to
development goals and secular feminist values. This means that it is
theoretically possible to assume that the interactions among such groups
can generate a dynamic whereby the ethos and the actions of the Islamist
movements may be challenged and re-shaped by rival organisations. To
conﬁrm the validity of such an expectation when analysing the case study,
we should ﬁnd evidence of political learning whereby the Islamist move-
ment revises its stances and its actions, following confrontation on a range
of issues that are the central concern of actors within the non-Islamist
sector of civil society. Secondly, it is possible to hypothesise that a rise in
Islamist militancy at the level of civil society generates mobilisation in the
opposite direction, precisely because their discourse is perceived to be
extremist and polarising. There are large sectors of society that are far
from sympathetic to the views expressed by Islamists, such as the urban
intellectual elites, which might be driven to form their own independent
associations in order to contest the civil space that the Islamists occupy
with alternative ideas and actions. These groups are often also opposed to
the incumbent regimes. It is therefore conceivable that ‘pushed’ by the two
forces of Islamism and regime authoritarianism, they would attempt to
create their own space and articulate their own demands. This, in turn,may
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have a positive eﬀect on the pluralism of views and ideas that is the back-
bone of democracy. Thus, in the analysis of the case study there should be
evidence of organisations being created or working harder because of the
desire to spread a message diﬀerent from that propagated by the Islamists.
Finally, given that all truly independent civil society actors operating in
an authoritarian regime face the same type of constraints on their activities
and are subject to heavy scrutiny (see Wiktorowicz 2001), it is possible to
hypothesise that Islamist and secular associations may cooperate on
certain matters, in order to extract beneﬁts from the regime and resist
some of the pressure coming from above. The case of the Saint Egidio
conference held in 1993/94 among Algerian parties, including the FIS, to
put forth a common platform for democratic change in the country may
therefore not be simply an isolated and exceptional cooperative attempt
(see Impagliazzo & Giro 1997). Thus, there should be evidence of such
cooperation on speciﬁc issues that are central to their operational ca-
pacities. If there were some evidence of joint demands and joint activities
aimed at increasing the autonomy of the space available to civil society, it
would signify that Islamism is capable of coming to terms with the
pluralism of views that exist in society.
To conclude, while the almost naı¨ve view that an active civil society is
good for democracy should be challenged, this should not lead one to
accept that all cases in the Middle East and North Africa ﬁt the opposite
category whereby a vibrant civil society where Islamists are prominent is
by deﬁnition authoritarian. In between the two extremes there may be
room to locate an Islamist civil society that can come to terms with the
procedures of democracy and the pluralism of ideas through interaction
and cooperation with others.
T H E C A S E O F M O R O C C O
Morocco is a good case to analyse for a number of reasons. First of all
there is an active civil society to analyse, given that the country is not as
authoritarian as others in the region. King Mohamed VI’s accession was
followed by a relaxation of the most authoritarian aspects of Hassan II’s
rule : political prisoners were freed, the press became more outspoken,
human rights abuses have diminished, and some political reforms have
been launched to make the state more accountable to its citizens. These
changes have had a positive eﬀect on society as whole, which has used
these newfound freedoms to set up associations and organisations dealing
with a wide range of issues, from human rights to sustainable development
to cultural protection (see Howe 2001). As a result, Brumberg (2002b)
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places Morocco in the category of ‘ liberalised autocracies ’, meaning that
decisions are ultimately taken by an unelected leader but society enjoys
a degree of political pluralism. In a recent interview, Moroccan con-
stitutionalist Omar Bendorou conﬁrmed that under the present consti-
tution, ‘all power is really in the hands of the King’ (Le Journal Hebdomadaire
23.4.2005). Secondly, Morocco has a strong secular intellectual tradition,
including a number of civil society actors who subscribe to secular prin-
ciples in the tradition of the French concept of laicite´. Finally, the strength
of Islamism in the country is quite unexpected, given that the king of
Morocco has religious legitimacy derived from his ancestral link with the
Prophet, expressed in the title Commander of the Faithful. For this reason,
it was believed by some that the kingdom would not be aﬀected by the
resurgence of Islam as a vehicle for political contestation (see Munson
1991).
It should be noted at this point that the ﬁndings regarding the complex
relationship between Islamism, civil society and democratisation cannot
readily be generalised to other countries in the region, given the meth-
odological limitations of a single case study. However, such ﬁndings can
indicate trends that may be found in other countries in North Africa,
particularly in societies that have gone through a period of liberalisation, if
not democratisation, over the last two decades.
The Islamist illiberal ethos?
The ﬁrst point to examine is the assumption that Islamist associations have
an ‘ illiberal ’ ethos that is intrinsic to their political and social discourse,
which makes them ‘uncivil ’. The contention here is that this is not
necessarily the case, and that the leading Islamist association in Morocco,
the Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan, may be a potential force for democratic change,
not only for what it says, but also for its ability to ‘ learn’ and adapt to its
environment through interaction with other civil society groups. The
Jamiat is by all accounts the leading Islamist association in Morocco, and
represents quite well the Islamist sector of civil society activism, given its
involvement in both developmental and political issues. It should be
emphasised that the association does not represent the entire galaxy of
Islamism in Morocco, as there are other groups whose political ideology is
based on the Islamic faith, but it does constitute that part of Islamism
which has turned neither to institutional politics (like the Party for Justice
and Development), nor to violence (like the fringe salaﬁ groups responsible
for the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca and the March 2004
bombings in Madrid).
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The Jamiat, founded in 1985 and led by Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine, is
the largest Islamic association in Morocco; it has a membership variously
estimated between 50,000 and 600,000, although the real number is
anyone’s guess. Its spokesperson (Jamiat int.) refused to disclose the infor-
mation, as the association is technically illegal and its members could be
prosecuted by the authorities for membership of an illegal organisation.
The number of members is however of little relevance and would not tell
us much about the impact of the association on the political life of the
country. Precisely because it is illegal to be a member, many ordinary
citizens prefer to be involved with it only in high proﬁle events such as
street demonstrations, or in voluntary work without formal links to the
association itself. In this respect, the association and its leader may be
considered very powerful because of the ‘reach’ they have among the
general public, and many in the NGO sector recognise their strength
(NGO leaders ints.).
The association is closely informed by an Islamic ethos whereby the
political, social and economic problems of the country can only be solved
if there is a widespread return of all citizens to the true spiritual values of
the faith. This is the basic ideological tenet which informs the work of
Jamiat. The sheikh himself has been a long-time opponent of the
monarchy and believes that the current system should be dismantled,
although change should not occur through violence but through civil
society activism. The foundation of the association’s work is therefore the
dawa, whereby its members endeavour to become better Muslims and
attempt through example to turn others into better Muslims, so that
individual behaviour can slowly aﬀect the whole of society. The emphasis
is on ‘education’. This is why it refuses to enter the political arena, or to
compromise with the king on this issue. The association sees political
participation not only as contrary to the doctrine of dawa, but also as a
strategic mistake that many opposition groups make because they do
not realise that they simply get co-opted without obtaining either
power-sharing or the radical change that is needed to turn the country
around. Although both scholars and policy-makers debate as to whether
the ideological stances and Islamist ethos of the association are conducive
to democracy or represent totalitarian objectives, this debate soon
becomes sterile because there is a signiﬁcant amount of second-guessing
when we analyse the association’s beliefs and internal structure in
isolation, without referring to the surrounding context where other actors
operate.
If we examine the Jamiat in isolation, we get two very diﬀerent pictures.
Through an analysis of the documents published by the sheikh and the
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association (see Yassine 2000, 2003), it emerges quite clearly that these
subscribe very strongly to the idea of procedural democracy as the best
way to govern both the association itself and the country. The work on the
ground through the dawa is always accompanied by a public call for
political institutions to become accountable, and for the political process to
be liberalised. For instance, in his memorandum, the Sheikh calls for the
end to election rigging, and calls on the king to end the fac¸ade democracy
measures implemented so far. The current political arrangements should
be replaced by a truly new method of governance based on the procedures
of democracy. According to Yassine (1999), ‘democratic rule, meaning in
short the freedom and the right of the people to choose their own
government, is the only way out of the darkness of authoritarianism’. This
also emerges quite strongly in the conversations with leaders of the Jamiat,
who emphasise how their association is governed by the principle of con-
sultation (embodied by the existence of a ten-man council elected by
members and responsible for selecting the leader), and how this sets them
apart from the country’s political institutions where there is no democracy,
as the leader is not elected by anyone and inherits power. The spokes-
person (Jamiat int.) argued: ‘we are against the way the political system
works in Morocco and therefore we would not want to replicate it within
our organisation’. The leadership claims that the association listens very
carefully to what ordinary members have to say about its operations and
about its political positions (‘we do not lead a group of sheep’). Given that
the Jamiat is also very clear on the issue of violence, which is ﬂatly rejected
as a method both to achieve political goals and to make individuals
conform to what the association deems proper Islamic behaviour, the
picture seems to be quite rosy. For all these reasons the association should
be considered as being fully part of civil society.
Naturally, all this is challenged quite strongly when the opposite picture
appears. First of all, the claim that the association has some form of
internal democracy is disputed, as the sheikh who founded it runs it as his
personal ﬁefdom and makes all the important decisions without any
regard for what other members think. It has been reported that in order to
become a full member of the organisation, candidates have to have a
dream of the sheikh bestowing upon them the worthiness of becoming a
militant for the Jamiat. This would hardly trigger a democratic debate
within the group, as ‘obeying the orders of the Sheikh becomes the pass for
Paradise ’ (Le Journal Hebdomadaire 12.2.2005). Thus, the leader’s messianic
role conditions the workings of the organisation. Secondly, the association,
far from being against the method of rule in Morocco, is more precisely
against the principle of the Commander of the Faithful, the imarat al
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mouminine, which bestows religious legitimacy on the king. There is a stark
diﬀerence between the two, because being against the imarat does not
equate with being against authoritarianism. Indeed many suspect that the
Jamiat wants to replace the institution of the imarat not with accountable
political institutions but with the rule of religious scholars, as in Iran (see
Maroc Hebdo International 24.6.2005). Finally, the association is also accused
of espousing illiberal views in the ﬁeld of personal rights. In this view, the
Jamiat is far from being the democratic, responsive and open organisation
it claims to be (see Maddy-Weitzman 2003).
The problem with this approach is that it is not conducive to under-
standing, because it is an absolutist debate that does not take into account
how the group interacts with its environment, consisting of rival Islamist
organisations, secular NGOs, and government-sponsored groups. If we
examine this aspect more closely, it emerges that the Jamiat may not
actually have the illiberal and anti-democratic ethos that some claim.
While the statements made by its leaders about the high degree of internal
democracy that supposedly exist should be treated with some scepticism, it
is true that on very practical issues ordinary members do have a voice.
This in turn forces the leadership to modify its stances on certain themes.
The clearest example of this has been the recent U-turn performed by the
association regarding the modiﬁcations to the ‘ family code’ proposed by
the king, which provides women with legal equality. As would be
expected, a very lively debate accompanied such an important reform,
with the king arguing for a complete revision of the previous family code
and its transformation towards the granting of eﬀective legal equality to
women. When the new legislation was ﬁrst presented, it faced substantial
opposition from the Jamiat, which organised a massive demonstration in
Casablanca to oppose its adoption. After some revisions that were more in
tune with the Islamic tradition of the country, the association did a spec-
tacular turnaround and today believes that the law does not go far enough
in terms of equality. According to a BBC report (24.1.2004) ‘Nadia
Yassine, spokesperson of Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan says [the law] does not go
far enough because women remain minors under the penal code, which
has not changed. ’ Not only that, but the spokesperson of the group (Jamiat
int.) claimed that ‘ the Sheikh had previously written about the necessity to
grant legal equality to women way before the beginning of such debate,
and therefore the changes were in tune with the group’s beliefs ’. In fact, a
change in attitude did take place and was the product of a number of
factors, but an important one was the position taken by women members,
with Nadia Yassine herself leading the way. Women members of the
association campaigned within the group to have the initial decision
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reversed if conditions changed. This triggered an internal debate that saw
them come out on top once this had eﬀectively happened.
This does not necessarily mean that the association is indeed a shining
example of internal democracy, but it points to the fact that involvement
of members may be greater than expected and that the Islamist ideology is
ﬂexible when the political rewards are high. Furthermore, this indicates
that once society at large is at peace with radical legal changes that might
be opposed in principle by the group, the latter is able to adapt.
Triggering a reaction?
One important paradox that is often overlooked when pondering the
strength of Islamism and its negative impact on the ‘civility ’ of society is
the fact that this perceived incivility may trigger a reaction, whereby non-
Islamist sectors of society organise themselves in order to counter the ex-
pansion of Islamism. The case of Morocco is particularly telling because
we do indeed ﬁnd evidence of such behaviour. This is a very important
aspect of the civil society debate, because it indicates that Islamism may
indirectly be a beneﬁcial contributor to the democratisation process.
As outlined by Pierre Vermeren (2002), Mohammed VI’s accession to
the throne in 1999 opened the way for a relaxation of procedures in the
creation of new non-governmental associations, coupled with greater in-
tellectual openness. Thus the most important factor in the impressive nu-
merical surge of NGOs is certainly the considerable change in the political
sphere with regards to freedom of association. However, it should also be
highlighted that some of the work done by speciﬁc secular groups such as
CIOFEM (Committee for the Rights of Women), ‘Springtime for
Equality ’, and other more local NGOs (particularly in remote villages and
poorer urban neighbourhoods) has been motivated by the necessity to
stem the rising tide of Islamism. This takes place at two levels. First of all,
at an intellectual level, some secular NGOs try to spread a message of
laicite´, which goes against the message that ‘ Islam is the solution’ propa-
gated by the Jamiat. They were particularly active at the time of the family
code reform debate, and doubled their eﬀorts once the Jamiat made its
opposition to the project known. Secondly, given that the greatest strength
of the Jamiat is not necessarily its political independence from the king, but
its provision of social services, some NGOs try to compete on this terrain.
As one ideological opponent of the Jamiat admitted: ‘ they [the Islamists]
provide jobs to the unemployed, they pay for weddings and funerals. They
have a network and they are very active ’ (NGO leader int.). In order to
counter this activism, some groups therefore operate on the same terrain.
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This is the case for instance in small villages where Islamism is not as
strong, and where individuals now create associations to manage the land
better, solve local disputes through cooperation, and practise some form of
local social democracy, in order to improve their lives without necessarily
subscribing to the political message of the Jamiat (NGO leader int.). In
rural areas, villagers remain for instance very much pro-monarchy while
the Jamiat is increasingly hardening its discourse against the monarchy,
with one leading member openly advocating the necessity for Morocco to
become a republic (Al Osbou’ya Al Jadida 2.6.2005). A similar competition is
taking place in urban settings where the Jamiat is considerably stronger.
Leftist groups are beginning to see the necessity of competing with the
Islamists on the provision of social services, in order to show that a social-
democratic project can not only deliver human rights (a rather abstract
concept in Moroccan shantytowns), but also practical results. This is
however a particularly diﬃcult task, because the largest leftist political
parties are actually quite disconnected from the associational movement,
and are therefore unable to articulate a clear political project that would
beneﬁt such NGOs. As one former leftist political prisoner put it (int.) :
‘political parties of the left have abandoned this strategy of providing
social services directly. Their strategy is to make changes from the top, by
being involved in the political process. NGOs that have leftist leanings do
that work now.’ Another diﬃculty that they encounter is, as one militant
lamented, ‘ the lack of ﬁnancial means’ (NGO leader int.), while Islamists
have considerable funds at their disposal. Obviously, the Jamiat can easily
point to the fact that the left has sold out, and that the secular project has
failed to bring development and justice to Morocco.
Diﬃculties notwithstanding, it is important to underline that the ex-
pansion of Islamism as civil society activism has also generated a response
from secular sectors (the feminist movement has been particularly active,
because it perceives itself as a potential victim of Islamist resurgence), and
this points to an expansion of the sphere of autonomy and debate that can
be beneﬁcial to the process of democratisation.
Coincidence of interests ?
Another interesting element of the current state of Moroccan civil society
that seems to contradict some of the assumptions of the literature on civil
society in the Arab world is the coincidence of interests that may exist
between Islamist associations and other organisations that belong to the
opposition camp. This is also an aspect that has been underinvestigated,
because of the widespread belief that too much civil society is not truly
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conducive to democratisation. This belief may hold true in the short term,
when many groups, in order to obtain results, bypass the discredited party
system and directly address the country’s leadership, reinforcing its
position as ultimate decision-maker. However, in the longer term, it is
possible to hypothesise that such groups may come to realise that the
strategy does not pay oﬀ in terms of real structural changes, and that they
therefore need to build bridges with other NGOs opposed to the wielders
of power, even if these do not share a similar outlook on what the future
society should look like. True opposition movements constituted in the
civil society sector operate under the same constraints because the
ruling elites deal with them in the same manner: repression, selective
co-optation, or bare tolerance. Thus, it is conceivable that all these groups,
irrespective of their objectives and ideological beliefs, have some interests
in common such as expanding the sphere of independence from the state
and making demands that see their concerns improved. This could lead
them, at times, to conduct the same battles for certain objectives or to use
the same methods to promote their views. In Morocco, such a coincidence
of interests has not gone as far as creating a common front that would pit
all sectors of civil society against the king, but there have been instances
when there has been a degree of informal cooperation on certain themes.
At the political level, Morocco has not gone as far as Egypt, where the
emergence of formal coalitions comprising Islamists and other leftist
secular groups is attempting ‘ to break the monopoly of the state and
oﬃcial opposition parties over the issue of reform’ (Al Ahram Weekly
27.6.2005), but there have been rapprochements around the issue of pol-
itical change. For example, there has been formal cooperation between
Islamist associations and human rights groups on issues ranging from
freedom of speech to the end of torture and the legal protection for
political prisoners. On the issue of freedom of speech, many secular groups
have defended the right of Nadia Yassine to question the validity of the
monarchical system, which has been a taboo for a long time in Morocco.
Groups as diverse as Amnesty International, Synergie Civique and the
Jamiat have come together to condemn the use of torture in Moroccan
prisons, and have expressed concern at the massive crackdown that
followed the Casablanca bombings, complete with torture and show trials.
This has led the director of a large secular NGO (int.) to state :
I have to say that on many topics, we ﬁnd that Islam can actually be of help
because most people are in fact able to make the connection between human
rights as we ‘ teach’ them and the religion. The Islamist organisations as well, we
have no problems at all with them, there is no confrontation and we do not get
harassed. On some things (i.e. torture) we even lead a common struggle, probably
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because recently it is something that concerns them directly. That said, there are
some topics about which our message is diﬃcult to make without coming in
opposition with some sectors of Islamism.
For its part, the Jamiat recognises that Morocco is a pluralist society, and
that there are groups that will promote very diﬀerent values and policies to
those that the Jamiat espouses, but at the same time, there are other groups
with which a dialogue can be held, although this statement was rather
qualiﬁed: ‘very few of these associations are actually free. There are
some that are truly independent and we co-operate with them’ (Jamiat
spokesperson, int.).
Finally, one area of ‘coincidence’ is the treatment of political prisoners
and dissidents. Both the Jamiat and secular organisations such as the
OMDH (Organisation Marocaine de Droits de l’Homme) or the
Moroccan antenna of Amnesty International are in agreement when it
comes to defending the rights of dissidents against unfair imprisonment or
exile. The OMDH for instance hailed the king’s decision to let Yassine out
of house arrest, despite the organisation’s very diﬀerent beliefs and politi-
cal objectives (Reuters 3.10.1999). For its part, the Jamiat heavily criticised
the regime for the harsh treatment that members of the leftist opposition
received during Hassan’s reign, and argues that the same should not
happen today to the popular Islamist opposition.
However it should be emphasised that some in the secular sector of
associational life still believe that the Islamists are still not to be trusted as
‘ the surge of Islamist activism is a danger for democracy in Morocco
because the vast majority of the diﬀerent components of Islamism do
not believe in the universal values of representative democracy. They
just want to use it to come to power’ (NGO leader int.). It follows that
cooperation should not be envisaged with them.
Despite the diﬀerences that exist among secular associations and the
rather self-congratulating attitude of the Jamiat, a process of building
bridges has begun on certain important themes between them. While at
this stage its is improbable that a formal alliance for political change will
be constituted, it is possible to envisage that in the long term the links that
are being created might lead to such an outcome given that the stated
preference of all actors is ‘dialogue with all the expressions of Moroccan
society ’ (Jamiat spokesperson int. ; NGO leaders int.).
: : :
Recent work on Arab civil society has the merit of challenging the
conventional wisdom on the normative character of civil society, and
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correctly emphasises that the concept of civil society is neither positive nor
negative per se, and should be treated as a neutral category. The problem
however is that this important theoretical point is derived from a very
partial and controversial empirical examination of the role of Islamism in
the region. Thus, civil society should not take on a negative connotation
simply because in the region it expresses itself largely through Islamism.
The ﬁndings from the case study of Morocco point, although not
decisively, in the direction of the democratic potential that the activities of
Islamist organisations have in three respects. First of all, their discourse
itself has democratic connotations rather than authoritarian ones. This is
due not necessarily to the ideology itself (which many accuse of being
totalitarian), but rather to the surrounding environment where other
associations exist and where social confrontation takes place on a number
of issues. The Jamiat is very aware of what is outside the organisation, and
in order to maintain its strength it is able to change with society and adapt
both its discourse and its activities. These interactions have an eﬀect on
how ordinary members behave, which is then reﬂected within the organ-
isation. Secondly, the surge of Islamist activism both in the welfare and
political sector has provoked a surge in the activism of those social groups
that are inimical to the Islamist project and do not share its outlook on
how the future of the country should be shaped. This increases the degree
of pluralism that exists in society, which in turn aﬀects the ability of
the authoritarian elites to keep society in line. Finally, given the type of
constraints that truly independent social actors face, there is some
evidence of Islamists cooperating with some secular organisations on key
themes with which both are concerned, particularly in the ﬁeld of basic
human rights and political reforms.
All this may not be suﬃcient to demonstrate that Islamism is a demo-
cratic force, but it is suﬃcient to question the assumption that Islamist
associations are devious groups solely bent on ‘ lying’ their way to power.
This has important academic implications, because it points to the im-
portance of civil society in promoting political change in the Arab world,
particularly in the long term. There are also considerable policy-making
consequences. Lately, there has been an increase, particularly in the
United States, in the number of warnings given to the American admin-
istration regarding the funding of civil society activism as the best tool to
promote democratisation in the Arab world. It is argued that civil society
actors have a very limited impact, they can be easily accused of selling out
to foreigners, and they can be taken over by security oﬃcials rendering
them ineﬀective. All this may be true, but the perceived failure of the
funding of civil society activism is also due to the fact that there is very little
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engagement with the truly popular civil society actors : the Islamists. The
coveted quest for ‘ secular, nationalist, and liberal organisations ’
(International Herald Tribune 13.8.2005) is not very productive if it occurs in
isolation. Engagement with Islamist groups becomes a necessity because
the political parties are discredited, and ‘secular ’ civil society is not yet as
strong. For the time being there is no way around Islamist groups if the
objective of Western policy-making is a pluralistic political order. This
view is beginning to be accepted at European level, as Roberto Aliboni
(2004) recently indicated, and may represent an alternative to exclusionist
policies that have not produced many positive results.
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